-page-....-2f-2f....-2f-2f....-2f-2fetc-2fpasswd (2026)

It looks like you're referencing a classic Local File Inclusion (LFI) Path Traversal attack pattern.

In Linux-based systems, the /etc/passwd file is a world-readable text file that contains a list of all registered users on the system. While it no longer contains actual passwords (which are now stored in the highly restricted /etc/shadow file), it remains a primary target for attackers because: OS Credential Dumping: /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow -page-....-2F-2F....-2F-2F....-2F-2Fetc-2Fpasswd

Modern web frameworks handle this automatically, but if you’re working with raw server variables, avoid decoding user input twice. In PHP, $_GET , $_POST , and $_REQUEST are already URL‑decoded. Never apply urldecode() again unless you absolutely know what you’re doing – that’s a common source of double‑encoding vulnerabilities. It looks like you're referencing a classic Local

A robust WAF can detect and block signature patterns associated with directory traversal, such as double URL encoding, repetitive dot-dot-slash sequences, and attempts to access known system files like etc/passwd . In PHP, $_GET , $_POST , and $_REQUEST

: While /etc/passwd must be readable by all users (to allow ls -l to display owner names), access to /etc/shadow is restricted to root. This ensures that sensitive information like encrypted passwords is protected.

The /etc/passwd file is the traditional target for proving LFI functionality because it meets several criteria for attackers: